PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION --AT WHAT COST?

The Case study of Markendeya Co operative Housing Society in Dharavi, Bombay.

ABSTRACT:

This is a case study of Markendeya Co operative Housing Society. It is located in Dharavi, Bombay. The study describes the events which have occurred in Dharavi since 1987 with some references to how the residents originally came to Dharavi. This will assist the reader to understand the nuances underlying the various twists and turns that the story of the society's formation and evolution seeks to highlight. In the annexes of the case study some background material on Bombay, and Dharavi is included for readers interested in the linkages between Dharavi and the city's development.

As this case study seeks to examine the concept of people's participation in shelter, only these aspects are brought to the forefront, in relationships to decisions related to choices, actions, permissions and negotiations. Since most of the interactions are with various government agencies, a small note explains what each agency does, and its role in Dharavi's Redevelopment.

One section of the looks at data on the families residing in the cooperative at various points in the last 4 years.

The saga of Markendeya is by no means over. The problems and difficulties faced by them continue, and may even fulfil the prophecy that the poor sell off their homes. This documentation seeks to highlight the distance that exists between the professional and the people, between the state and the community, and the urgent need to explore ways by working out a truly enabling strategy whereby state resources assist communities achieve secure shelter with their central participation and involvement.

Finally there is a photo feature of Dharavi, some maps and drawings.

Seeking shelter along with food and water has rightly been regarded as a fundamental instinct of human beings. Early man used nature's raw materials to provide himself with shelter. There was a harmony between nature and man.

Modern society has disrupted this harmony. The market economy had made land a saleable commodity. As a result the poor are driven out of the land market. Additionally, the plethora of legislation on housing obliges a citizen to conform to certain concept, standard and style of housing, the costs of which are so prohibitive that the poor simply cannot afford shelter. Consequently the vast majority of people today 'squat' on land 'unauthorised' structures. In Bombay approximately 45% of the population live in unauthorised structures, popularly known as slums.
Poverty in the rural areas coupled with job opportunities in the urban areas is the cause of migration of the poor to a metropolis like Bombay. However even in the urban areas the extent of poverty is quite high resulting in an average of nearly 48% persons below the poverty line on an all India basis.

Over the years migration has contributed decreasingly to the over all growth of Bombay's population though it has not meant a corresponding decrease in growth rate. This implies that availability of housing stock has to increase proportionately. However, all the agencies, public and private put together are able to create a maximum of 15 to 20 thousand formal housing units a year. The annual gap in the decade of 1971-81 was 45,000 units per year.

In the matter of housing land in the most important commodity. In Bombay as elsewhere land is concentrated in the hands of few. According to the latest available figures about the owners of excess vacant land under the urban land (ceiling and regulation) [UL(CxR)] Act, in Bombay, about 3% of the land owners own and possess over 50% of the excess vacant land.

Nearly 4 million persons or 45% of the population of Greater Bombay live in slums. An additional 4 laksh live on the pavements. For the purpose of housing people have been grouped into 3 month income categories; Upto Rs.350 economically weaker sections between Rs.350-Rs.600 low income group Rs.601-Rs.1500. Middle income group. Nearly 80% of the slum households and nearly 90% of the pavement households have an income less than Rs.600 per month (college of social work: A profile of pavement dwellers; Bombay 1982 studies show that assuming that credit was available to the poor the housing budget of households earning less than Rs.600 would not be more than Rs.8,300/- (BMRDA: Regional Housing Policy, Bombay 1978).

The cheapest formal housing programme under the various schemes of the UL(CxR) Act was intended to make formal housing tenements available at Rs.135/- per sq. foot. Till recently the smallest tenement of Rs.25 sq. mts. (250 sq. ft.) cost a minimum of Rs.36,325/-. Thus under the cheapest formal housing schemes neither the EWS nor the LIG can afford even the smallest tenement. The price has recently been raised to Rs.180 per sq. foot.

Increasingly therefore, the poor in the city are forced to seek extra legal means to fulfil their basic need of shelter. The legislation enacted till today does not confer any right to the poor either.

Legislation :

Historically the role of government housing has undergone a considerable amount of change.

In the early period of British colonialism in India housing was considered a concern of the individual. To build a house was only the responsibility of the individual. The government did not come into the picture at all.

However in the later stage, Municipal laws were amended, empowering the MC is to provide housing for the poorer classes. For instance the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act 1988 was amended in 1933 section 354C was introduced. It provided for improvement schemes. Under this, resources permitting, dilapidated buildings and areas prone to be hazardons to health are to be improved by the corporation. The section also provides that the corporation
may construct houses for the poor classes. The corporation is to acquire lands for this purpose.

Section 354 RM of the BMC Act empowers the corporation to provide housing accommodation for poor classes if it is satisfied that there is no need for an improvement scheme. The houses have to be constructed on lands belonging to or acquired by the corporation. House belonging to the corporation can also be constructed into houses for poor.

Though these provisions authorise the corporation to take positive action for providing housing for the poor, hardly any use has been made of them.

**Regional and Town Planning Acts.**

Modern Town planning based on British legislation came to India in 1915 when the Bombay Town planning Act was passed. It enabled local authorities to prepare Town planning schemes of open areas within their jurisdiction which were in the process of development. Indigenous towns had grown without formal plans. The Town planning Act was introduced in order to plan new development in a formal manner to avoid haphazard and unregulated extensions of towns and to ensure orderly development.

In 1954 this Act was superseded by a new Town Planning Act. It made obligatory, for local authorities the preparation of development plans for the whole area within their jurisdiction. The objective was to plan for the whole area within their jurisdiction. The objective was to plan for comprehensive development of an urban area rather than planning for it in parts. This Act bought the whole area of a city under formal planning and Town planning schemes were required to be prepared within the framework of a Town/city Development Plan.

**Development Plans:**

A Development Plan is primarily a land use plan. It contains proposals for zoning the development in residential areas, for allocations of land for public purposes, for infrastructural development and for traffic and transportation network. The plan document is accompanied by information regarding the cost of land acquisition, estimate of work and phases of development.

Development control rules regulate the division of large landholdings into individual building plots, the density of population and the floor space index.

Building bye-laws specify the minimum standards of structural quality, ventilation and sanitation, minimum area of accommodation to be provided and dimensions of open spaces around buildings.

In 1966 the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act was passed. This Act enlarged the scope of physical planning further to extend over the region surrounding metropolitan and industrial centres. The Regional Plan like the Town/City Development plan is primarily a land use plan.

The procedure laid down for preparing these plans is such that they are prepared and sanctively by the governments. They simply remain declarations of intentions of the plans. Statutory requirements as in the case of city Development Plans for providing estimates of work, a
statement of cost and phases of development remain were academic exercises. The actual implementation of the plans bears little relationship to them.

In no way can the planning exercise be said to have increased the access of the urban poor to land and infrastructural facilities. On the contrary planning has increased the polarisation in living conditions between the rich and the poor. An increasing proportion of the urban population is forced to reside in unauthorised shanty settlements in total contravention of the city Development Plans.

In the name of creating an orderly, hygienic and aesthetically pleasing environment, town planning in fact denies the poor to access to adequate housing and environment. Its discriminatory for it attempts to create planned environment at the cost of the availability of even basic services to the poor; they are forced to become illegal, unauthorised city residents because they do not have the means to afford even the minimum authorised accommodation. Town planning determines the distribution of resources (land, water, revenue) among different groups of the city's residents. Since it takes place in the context of urban land market forces and private property development what it achieves is to create infrastructural advantages (transport facilities, roads, puls building open spaces etc) so that the private building sector can reap benefits. The poor being incapable of competing in the urban land or housing market are marginatised and have to live in wretched conditions wherever they can put up their unauthorised and meagre shelter.

**The Slum Areas Act:**

The slum areas (Improvement and clearance) Act was passed in 1956 and applied to some Union Territories including Delhi. The Act primarily applied to dilapidated, over crowded and insanitary pucca authorised buildings. By amendments made after 1964 the Act encompassed unauthorised hutment settlements also. Subsequently similar Acts were passed by 11 states in the country. The Act provies for the improvement of existing slums by way of providing basic services, piped water supply, latines, drainage, paved path ways and street lighting.

The definition of a slum given in the Act refers to the inadequacy of Shelter in its structural quality hygienic condition and availability of basic facilities. It does not refer to the question of ownership of land on which a slum may be situated.

Even in "Declared" or "Improved hutments", the ownership of the land is retained with the original owner and the residents get no legal status or right to stay on it. The Act merely enable the competent authority to allow hutment settlements without being treated as tresspassers, even on privately owned land and provide them with basic services. The slum areas act provides no alternative to the question of shelter and sanitation for the poor. It merely aims at relieving the wretched conditions in hutment slums but experience shows that it fails to achieve even this limited objectives because at the same time the present practice of Town Planning continents to exclude the poor from some fundamental necessities of a better life.

**Urban Land (centry & regulation) Act 1976.**

It was partly with the realisation that urban land is concentrated in the hands of a few as reflected in the fifth five year plan that parliament passed the UL Act in 1976.
The main objective of the Act as reflected in the preamble is to prevent concentration of urban land in the hands of a few persons and prevent speculation profiting therefore and with a view to bring about equitable distribution of urban agglomeration to subsequent the common good. However it is a classical e.g. of legislation enacted in the name of poor but shellfully manipulated to benefit the private builders.

To achieve the objective of the Act, the government is entitled under section 10 of the Act to acquire excess vacant land. The compensation payable under the Act does not exceed Rs.10 per sq. meter, a miniscule proportion of the market value today and the maximum compensation payable is only Rs.2 lakhs.

I. Introduction

1. Although this paper refers specifically to strategies of finance in shelter, its analysis is applicable for all processes in development. Moving away from a more traditional argument of who alone should pay for development, we suggest that argument to be reformulated towards who pays what cost towards development. Truly sustainable development and change are not possible unless everyone who is affected by the issue is first part of debate and are able to participate in the creation, execution and maintenance of the solution. Such a process presumes that all actors should contribute, any one who does not participate gets alienated either by designation or default. This is detrimental to the actors and to the process. In a rapidly shrinking world, there is an increasing interdependence between local and global issues, resources and ideas, and therefore all solutions must ensure that all such local and global issues, concerns, ideas and resources comfortably interlink and support each other and most important, the people whose lives are to be changed by the process, are centrally involved in the new solutions.

2. Although this sounds rather naive and utopian in a sophisticated and generally market driven world - the decade of the 1990's more than any other decade sharply reminds us that not all things can be bought and sold as commodities. Secure shelter creates homes and strong stable communities - which in turn reproduce stable and productive citizens. These processes cannot be "bought" nor sold - they belong in a different category in which the "output" and only be achieved if it can be nurtured, supported assisted and facilitated by financial legal or economic policies and government regulated programs.

3. If this concept is easily accepted, then the next one, which is "how to deal with the poor" begins to move towards possibilities of a solution. Impoverishment of physical resources is only part of the process of impoverishment. Therefore just deployment of physical resources will not re energies the poor to integrate into socio/economic systems. The most crucial part is the re-creation and re-generation of mechanisms, structures and processes among the poor over which they have control and through which they can exercise their choices in the process of development.

4. Those of us who participate actively in developmental processes often make choices when we enter this business. Either we believe we know best what is good for the poor, or we feel the poor know best what is good for them. Time and wisdom from experience usually shows that the truth lies half way. The poor know what they need and why -- but they also need interventions because their present resources alone cannot transform the situation. If it could have, then they would have achieved the transformation already.
Like various development processes, shelter in general and housing finance in particular present challenges in formulating solutions to locate who plays what role, who provides which resource and what the outcome can be and where it likely to move developmental programmes.

5. To provide the reader with some background information we present the Indian urban situation and the latest government response to it.

In this paper, taking housing finance its resource availability to the poor and its ultimate use to build solid and secure shelter, we examine the -

- the latest government response
- some present NGO/CBO responses
- to where we want them to be.

- Evaluation of shelter related activism in Urban areas
- SPARC/NSDF/MM
- peoples alliances
- institution building
  - setting up gender sensitivity people centres alternatives
  - legitimizing these alternatives to set up interaction with the State.
- Formulating alternatives

**II. How the situation appears today, using Bombay as an example.**

1. Historically Indian cities especially Bombay pulled the poor into cities to work, with some interest in their housing only as far as it attracted them into cities when industry needed them. Even there the state/MC did little themselves, they set up charities and trusts to build these tenements which were over crowded. All this ended by the 1930's when the textile boom manned. In general - all cities informally located space for poor "outside" on land not needed at that moment. With poor being pushed further as land requirement of cities grew.

   2. Post Independence cities formalized the process of demolitions and evictions and sought justification in clearing unhygienic and dirty settlements to clean up the city. It also had a token housing construction program which built houses for the poor - but none of these were affordable for the poor and welcomed by the middle income city residents equally hungry for housing stock.

3. Through much of the 60-70's - housing strategies in urban areas were like an ostrich with head stuck in the mind not acknowledging growing houselessness - increasing urban squatting because of poor planning. The state wanted to reverse urbanization - send the poor back into villages and providing urban shelter was seen as encouraging the poor who should not have come in the first place.

By the mid 1970's migration to cities planned and the process of planning for the first time "planned" smaller cities to cut flow with the colonial metro cities. This was successful as new cities have begins to grow, older cities have less in migration. However, the problem of shelter so sharp in large cities is evident in the new metro's and class A towns as town planning tools continue on the same victorian lines as were brought in by the British as do Municipal Administration who use the BMC Act 1981 as their mother code.
4. In the 1990's the demographic projections indicate rapid escalation of urbanization. Despite having the lowest urban migration rate in Asia - this is anticipated to rapidly change, as rural areas become urban through choice on non agricultural production.

Shelter more than any other basic human need gets affected by these changes and directly and indirectly affects health, education, occupation income and indeed the entire process of socialization of those who are forced to stay in squatted over crowded and insecure situations. In the 1990's more than any other decade in the past micro reality echoes the same disparity and polarization of the circumstances within which the poor and the rich co-exist.

5. By the sheer numbers in both percentages and actuals - the present devastation that this difference represents demands both global and local attention - in a way no past ideological perspective could ever demand. And therefore requires a true assessment of how minimum shelter needs can be ensures as the basis for a sustainable development in the future.

III. The Official Position

1. In General

1. Traditionally "housing" and shelter were never a priority sector in the government planning process. Only commercial/industrial construction linked to production was area of focus. Within this urban shelter requirement was not mentioned at all.

2. Gradually, as part of an international transformation, shelter and housing became sectors important as an "industry" and began to get delinked from "soft" areas such as health and education.

3. In the Preface to "Report of the working Group on Finance for the Housing sector for 8th Plan (1992-97) published by the planning commission in June 1991 Dr.N Sengupta states in his foreword "the magnitude of the housing problem in the form of backlog as well as poor condition of existing stock continues to be daunting. Housing activity requires to be given high priority, because it satisfies a basic human need and also contributes significantly to employment generation an productivity improvement both directly and indirectly through linkages effects on other sectors of the economy."

4. There is a "draft national Housing Policy" document which aims to eradicate houselessness improve housing conditions - by providing minimum basic services and amenities to all. Both the draft policy and the Report see an efficient delivery system of available
finance as essential when supported by other policies related to land and infrastructure arrangements.

5. The present backlog in housing calculated by the 1991 census and NHB, NBO is 31 million houses of which 10.4 million are urban. The National Building Organization estimates 21.77 million dwelling units need to be constructed including 5.82 million to be upgraded - estimated to cost Rs. 97.530 crores - which is recommended in the target of the 8th Plan (1992-97). This will require 12.2% of the budget outlay (public/private) as compared to 9% in the 7th Plan. However all studies indicate that 80% of housing loans (NIUA) come from non-formal sources, while another calculation (Report) states only less than 10% investment is from formal plan outlay.

6. With specific reference to the poor

Within the general situation and statistics presented, there is a stark absence of the share of poor. The NIUA study indicates that with the poor being unable to borrow (access and availability) they are forced to borrow at exhorbitant rates or liquidate assets at disadvantageous rates.

7. Further, in a situation where private agencies are likely to be motivated by profit consideration and free play market could leave poor out of housing markets.

The 8th Plan is recommended by the report to provide direct assistance - targeted subsidies or material or delivery support for in-situation upgradation, new site and house construction for groups who can't afford.

8. The strategy for urban and rural housing support varies. In the urban - it first of all acknowledge that subsidies rarely reach poor, the demands far accede the provisions. And given the present structural adj. and economic crisis, there will not be a great deal of budgetary resources allocated. Therefore the government should improve.

- housing finance delivery
- Regularize insecure land tenure
- increase access to formal housing
- re

While rural housing problems is in the form of occupancy rights, access to material and assistance for construction, the urban poor face scarcity of reasonable shelter - manifested in overcrowded slums and squatter settlements. The poorer segments seem to have no chance to acquire legal housing and squatter housing provides the only affordable form of housing. With affordability however goes in security of tenure, threat of eviction, lack of basic services and poor environment quality. In the absence of reasonable alternatives it may be necessary to confess occupancy rights to requesting dwellers as with secure land tenure people will have access to loans from HFI.

9. With special focus on Housing finance, the report recommends:
1) The solution therefore lies in integration, and not supplying the informal system with the formal system - so that the ensuring completion could make informal system more effective in generalizing a substantial amount of housing investment."

2) Clearly there is need for an interface between formal institutions and the poor - and also some mechanism for regulating relationship between NGOs and HFI's - this relationship could help both HFI and the poor.

3) That HFI need to become more flexible and give loans without collaterals of mortgages getting more local cooperative banks involved in the process.

4) NGO and CBO should
   - create awareness for savings and motivate people to save
     - provide advisory services to manage informal credit unions/chit funds.
   - Act as interface between banks and poor.
   - Fix rate of interest on saving as 1% more than inflation rate) and loans 2% more.

IV. Evolution of shelter related activism in cities and town in India

1. General

   With some understanding of what government expectation, allocation and projections are, there is a need to match this up with where NGO/CBOs are, what they seek to do, and what role they can play in this process. To do that, there is a need to understand that "Housing" and "shelter" per se are and generally have not been the focus of NGO intervention and activism - not in the way of say health, education programs.

   In India, there are only a handful of NGOs urban and rural who are either "Housing" NGOs or call shelter as the critical focus of their work. Most of these organization have said to develop a strong shelter focus because they were headed by an architect. Due to this on the one hand shelter linked NGOs are few, and those who are working are generally providing designing and construction inputs.

   Many more NGOs have undertaken construction of housing. - either as part of disaster mitigation or as part of health and sanitation - in these cases, houses have been built for the poor as demonstration.

   Many more groups of poor slum dwellers have been active on shelter first to protect settlements from demolition and eviction and later for improvement and upgradation. However very few have received much support to move beyond this. Therefore it can be stated that by and large the critical requirement of shelter as the most important basis for reversing empowerment has only recently come for debate and by and large its value as a "Right" of all under various international continents is still to be manifested in peoples day to day life.

   Shelter more than any other area of basis needs is the most political. Its basis is land security and therefore its solutions can never emerge from technical or managerial interventions. Such political choices inhibit most NGOs (especially in urban areas) to take on shelter as its activity as it immediately complicates the NGO functioning - from funding, to projects, to "output". As though this was not enough, all housing and shelter related professionals and
technicians further complicate the issues by a clutter of confused technicalities - guaranteed to the everything and everyone into knots. This is so for shelter in general - it is even more true for shelter finance - because now there are bankers, economists and financial advisors.

2. **With specific Reference to SPARC:**
   
   SPARC itself did not plan to work on shelter as its main intervention when it was established in 1984. It set itself the task of working with the poorest in the city, and amongst them with women. A wide range of what we call "historic accidents" lead to SPARC.

   .to identify shelter as a main "agenda" for intervention for the poor.

   .to create educational processes to train
   its staff and poor people to train its staff
   and poor people to understand shelters.

   .to locate a role for itself as a promoter of peoples organization who were to be the main vehicles of transformation.

   .to develop alliances with peoples organization and assist them to reach out to other poor, in other settlements, in other cities and other countries.

   .to support their member federation to get land, to design and construct houses and due to this to subsequently.

   .to get housing finance to support that process.

3. **Developing a problem solving mechanism**

   In the past 7 years, regardless of whether we are referring to any of the above processes or other education/health or allied areas, there is a universal methodology to how this process takes place and how it will move and who ultimately will OWN it.

   1.Initially identification of problems emerged as a "reaction" to specific event or government policy. Gradually it became possible to have a greater insight into the present situation to anticipate certain eventualities and begin to formulate "proactive" sluices or inputs.

   2.Having identified a need, required for its various manifestations to be located - affected groups of poor were the best "actors" for this and federations of the poor were soon adapt at facilitating this process.

   3.This also required understanding and analysis of how the government and its various levels perceived the problem, what they sought to do about it and why. This again was initially done ;by SPARC, but gradually picked up by federations.

   4.Linking peoples situation to the "outside" (i.e. government, private sector etc) became the next set. This had several dimensions.

      a)Creating legitimacy - that there is a problem and the state needs to think about it.
      b)Creating information/data base on which debate can take place.
c) Locating groups of poor who want to seek alternatives because it is urgent in solving their problems and supporting them to move ahead - so that this experiential understanding will assist creating alternative and building up capacities.
d) Educating everyone within and outside to examine the various components of the process and -exploring what resources are available and can be got - its terms and conditions and so on.

Completing this form of pilot process so that
- we explore an alternative and evaluate its output
- locate roles and functions of actors present, past future
- explore how to scale up and locate resources to do this.

e) Enter into a negotiation between the poor, the state and any other actors needed.

Within this methodology SPARC perceives itself as a catalyst initially whose presence breaks the status quo. However, in the larger process it clearly locates "output" to emerge from creating institutions and processes owned and controlled by peoples federations which will enter into arrangements with government or other agencies.

Gender sensitivity in all processes and overall capacity building are twin goals which SPARC demands in all its relationships - all other goals are what communities desire. Having attempted to explain this process in general we now move to housing finance.

4. Locating the present situation within which SPARC/NSDF/MM are today

- a) Organizationally (About us)
b) Their present focus of activism Bombay federation and
c) How housing projects are "located" or situation within their
d) The three housing project
e) Two parallel process
   - immediate procurement of HF
   - emerging trends of how best systems should deal with shelter.
f) How we propose to link them together to design the HF process for the poor.

IV. NGO Resources

Given the magnitude of the shelter problem and its indispensability as a basic right and need - the historical evolution of NGOs, then preoccupations, their interventions then also affect what they say or do not say in various problem solving processes.

As mentioned earlier, most NGOs acknowledge value of shelter. But that is not the focus of their work. And where it is, its often to demonstrate alternatives. Therefore there is very little attention to direct innovation and experimentation at creating systems and alternatives to provide large numbers of poor people basis shelter NCHR (_____ ) represents one of the few
campaigns which has brought many NGO, trade unions, urban and rural groups to campaign for government legislation for secure housing.

As a result, at a point of time when institutional debates and national discussion on shelters take place - and NGOs are invited for consultations, there are few proactive innovations and alternatives presented and as very few NGOs have attempted them ;and NGOs rarely participate ad debtors and contributors to policy.

With specific reference to HF, the 1990's and the next 5 year plan document reflect this. The government, the banks and HFI in collaboration with UNCHS, WB and other institutional organizations have located NGOs as good "middle men". Many documents and experimentation project government and private sector HFI allocations to flow from them to NGO and through them to the poor. The HFI's will "train" NGOs to handle the paper work, pay them for their services and entrust all responsibility of repayment on them.

Such is the trend today and almost all NGOs accept this - Its acceptable because -

. The NGOs work in 2-10 slums and this becomes a local facility
. But how many will be reached through such a ration
. Housing loans are long term there is no negotiations on
  - duration, interest rates
  - costs etc.
. NGOs have not yet anticipated or experienced handling such funds and its impact on their relation with people.

There are many such specific issues - but at a larger level it is questionable as to
  - how many NGOs will be needed to "serve" poor.
  - Why HFI/B are unwilling to service this sector or interest in infrastructure.
- Why "what role people need to play" is so glaringly invisible in this situation.

IV.C SPARC's perspective

1.SPARC envisages that the state and people have to participate in a wide spectrum of relationships - some of which will solve developmental issues. The historic silence of the poor and their absence in planning and execution of development projects is a result of the failure of the state to generally ignore the poor in decision making and to ignore the fact that dialogue and debate and negotiation require preparation to participate in the process.

In the area of shelter and HI in particular, all debates either ignore or obliterate the reality that if money is to be lent/given to poor, they have to use it, and if borrowed, they have to return it. Such a transaction requires rituals, transactions, understand of choices and alternatives and a accepted outcome.

The present absence of understanding of how poor earn spend and save and how they make choices and what possibilities they will choose lead to designing strategies doomed to failure.

When strategies are redesigned they "allocate" roles, responsibilities and resp on the poor and these are neither explained nor negotiated - thus often becoming failures and further strengthening the stereo type that poor are unbankable.
Therefore having got on ourselves deeply emerged in peoples needs for secure shelter, we locate our role in creating systems.

- first for the poor to decide what they want
- to build through skills and leg to negotiate with state
- to execute solution

A brief background of how the general process began and develop.

IV.E. Much of the work in the last 7 years has initiated various processes within poor communities and many negotiations were undertaken. There are many negotiations with the state on land, basic amenities and so on. Housing finance emerges as a sub-unit of that process. In 1992 there are several elements in the process all seemingly unlinked presently - but which we see as ingredients in a solution for an alternative to peoples involvement in housing finance.

1. Since 1986-87 when shelter training began, there has been a drive for women to begin various kinds of savings.

   g) Understanding "costs" and dealing with their
MAKANDEYA CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY
D H A R A V I

FIRST DRAFT

OCTOBER 1991
CHAPTER I

1."The Urban animal"

CARL Haub, a U.S. demographer calculates that at 2:04 a.m. on Dec 5, 2006, the world will become predominantly urban. His calculations are on the basis of current UN population projections. The projection makes the point that the human animal is about to become primarily an urban animal. The historic event will be comparable to the conversion of the majority in the mists of time, from hunters and gatherers to settled agriculturalists.

The urban environment is largely of our own making, as distinguished from the rural environment which is largely the product of nature. Broadly interpreted, the urban environment involves the physical, social, economic, political and institution features of life support systems in cities.

Rapid urbanization is now almost exclusively a Third World phenomenon; roughly nine tenths of urban growth is expected to occur in less developed countries over the next 28 years. Of 23 cities, 3 are in India. Bombay is ranked in 6th position for a projected population growth of 15.4 million in the year 2000. With an estimated population of 11.1 million in 1990 having grown to this size from 2.9 million in 1950.

Not only do high birth rates swell urban numbers, but the rural poor flow into metropolitan areas in search of a better life. The current urban growth rate of 3.6% in the developing world means a doubling of the urban population in less than 20 years.

2."Two sides of the coin"

This staggering population growth has swamped the great new urban centres, putting unbearable pressure on civic services.

Less developed countries have tried to keep migrants out of metropolitan areas by fiat and force; by constructing satellite cities to siphon off migrants and by offering various economic incentives to keep rural folk in the countryside. But only force as used in a few authoritarian nations, is effective.

Some city planners complain that rapid urbanization has led critics to suggest that swollen and still growing cities have become symbols of not only poverty and social deprivation but
also of ecological destruction, pollution, unhealthiness, congestion a sort of permanent exhibition of environmental crime.

On the flip side, there seems to be a relationship between high levels of urbanisation and high level of growth per capita and gross national domestic product (GNP), suggesting that urbanization normally associated with images of desperate rural - urban migrants and hopeless slums and squatter settlements should also be seen as an instrument for socio-economic advancement and progress. Less developed cities are powerful engines of development. Roughly 60% of the GNP is urban generated by about 1/3rd of the total population. And urban centres may account for as much as 80% of GNP growth by the century's end. [Pietio Garan, a senior researcher for the UN Centre for Human Settlements (HABITAT)]

As one World Bank official put it "People and enterprises appear to be more productive in cities than in the countryside and more productive in large cities than in small towns. Millions of rural people have endorsed this proposition by migrating to urban areas, particularly mega cities.

3. BOMBAY

In Bombay around 60% of the house holds and about 70% of households in the slums belong to the low income group. The majority of the slum dwellers came to Bombay after 1960 and roughly 50% of the migrants are non Maharashtrians. Of the housed families 58.8% live in chawls; 11.3% in huts and 26.8% in apartments. The chawls accommodate 80% of the low income group within the city limits.

GROWTH OF BOMBAY

Historical review

For centuries, the island of Bombay formed a coastal outpost of the land based Hindu powers in western India. It remained outside the sphere of maritime commerce which encompassed other seaports in the region such as Sopara, Thana, Kalyan and Chaul.

The earliest urban development in Bombay occurred under Hindu rule in the 13th and 14th century when a descendent of the ruling dynasty of Gujarat migrated southward and built the town of Mahim as his new capital. This capital continued as a Kasba under the Muslims and thereafter, the Portuguese. The Portuguese pioneered direct European sea trade with Asia and landed in India at the close of the 15th century. Within a few decades, they managed to control some of the sea routes and acquired small territories along the west coast of India as Crown colonies. Their chief centre was Goa. Bassein was a subsidiary centre of which Bombay was a part. They created the new city of Bombay in 1636. Bombay remained overshadowed by Bassein located 25 miles to the north.

In 1661, as part of the matrimonial and military alliance between Portugal and Britain - the port and Bombay island was ceded to Charles II. After a few unprofitable years as Crown property, the commercially unproductive island was transferred in 1667 to the East India Company to which it owes it entire growth. The company had already established a trading centre or "factory" at the Moghul port of Surat in the adjoining northern province of Gujarat in 1612. As the largest port in India, Surat combined access to the rich textile manufacturing
hinterland in Gujarat; access to all the major cities in the sub continent; ship building and shipping facilities and a complete commercial infrastructure, including the chain connecting the cotton producer to the weaver to the exporter, through a variety of agents. The English factory at Surat utilized all these facilities and thrived on the trade but was subject to several constraints. These included local supervision and controls, including the payment of customs duties. The rivalry of other European merchant companies and the sense of insecurity due to the imperial Moghul ban on foreign fortifications within their domain were some constraints.

The East India Company's interest in Bombay therefore stemmed from two major considerations: its proximity—which could guarantee trade and its insularity—which could ensure independence and security. Bombay’s primary role was to serve as a naval base and as a port of transhipment. Merchandise of Gujarat was brought from Surat with the help of Gujarati merchants, to be re-exported to Europe. This role was greatly facilitated by Bombay's natural harbour which faced the main land across Bombay and provided safe anchorage in all seasons.

Thus Bombay was founded and nurtured on sea trade between Gujarat and Britain and was in effect its extension into Maharashtra. This was at once its strength and its weakness. Although geographically Bombay belonged to the region of Maharashtra, its situation was peripheral to this region in more than the physical sense. It was cut off from the hinterland by the Sahayadri mountains. Also Maharashtra did not possess a commercial tradition nor large scale manufacture of export. Gujarat provided not only merchandise (cotton piece goods collected at Surat) but also a sizable and experienced trading community. At Surat, the small group of English merchants at Bombay, depended heavily on Gujarat for merchants and agents at every stage. Thus the commercial hinterland of Bombay was Gujarati although its geographical hinterland was the adjacent region of Maharashtra.

This link between Bombay and Surat continued until the end of the 18th century. Soon thereafter, the Industrial Revolution in Britain gathered momentum. As a result, Indian textiles were no longer in demand in Britain and Bombay started to export the raw cotton of Gujarat and its neighbouring parts, to the new cotton mills in Manchester. As the port became the principal outlet of this export trade and thrived on it, the indigenous textile centres, especially those in Gujarat suffered a severe decline.

The cotton trade was supplemented by opium collected from Gujarat and the adjoining Malwa region and exported to China. Bombay's trade as a whole received a tremendous impetus after 1813 when the East India Company's monopoly ended and Indian trade was opened to all British merchants.

Commercial success stimulated the political and military activities of the Bombay government resulting in its involvement in the regional politics in the early 19th century. Most of Western and Central India at that time was controlled by the confederacy of Maratha Chiefs, which was headed by the Peshwas of Poona. After a series of military involvements the Bombay government finally defeated the Maratha army at the Battle of Kirkee outside Poona in 1817. Consequently the Company government annexed most of the Maratha dominions and became masters of a large part of western India, thus completing its conquest of the sub continent which had started in the 18th Century with the occupation of first eastern and then southern India.
In 1858 the East India Company's control ended and its territorial possessions passed to the British Crown, later becoming part of the British Empire. But in spite of administrative responsibilities, maritime trade remained pivotal to Bombay's growth. To that end Bombay harbour was assiduously developed, and the ship building industry, started in 1735 by a Parsi master - builder, specially invited from Surat, was fully encouraged.

The most eventful period for Bombay was between 1861-65 when the American civil war took place. The supply of raw cotton from America was cut off. Western India emerged as the alternate source of raw cotton for the British industries. The cotton boom (despite the post war crash) had tremendous financial implications on the prosperity and construction craze in the city.

The mid 19th century also witnessed the entry of Bombay into the Industrial Age. This last major phase in the city's development was initiated with the introduction of modern technology, applied in the construction of mills and railways. The cotton mill industry was the creation of private Indian entrepreneurs employing indigenous capital and imported British technology, with the aim to "fight" Manchester with her own weapons. The first Bombay mill was started in 1854, and in twenty years Bombay boasted 15 cotton mills, employing a daily average of over 11,000 workers and consuming over 82,000 bales of cotton.

Bombay's enormous potential for industrial growth included the availability of capital and an entrepreneurial community (mainly Parsis and Gujeratis), supply of cheap labour from the neighbouring areas of Konkan and Deccan, supply of raw cotton from Gujarat and Khandesh; transportation facilities including railways and shipping. This lead to a rapid proliferation of cotton mills and a variety of other industrial manufacture which soon made Bombay one of the largest industrial centres in the sub continent.

**Geographical growth**

Bombay Island was in reality, a group of seven islands separated by tidal marshes. The long and narrow island at the southern most extreme was called Colaba, and immediately to its north was the small old Woman's Island. Further north lay the largest of the islands shaped like the letter "H". Its original name of "Mumbai" which was corrupted to Portuguese "Bombaim" and English "Bombay", was sometimes applied to the whole island group. The western part of this group consisted of the two islands of Worli and Mahim stretching north wards, while parallel to them in the east were the smaller Mazagaon island and an elongated island without a common name but known by the localities of Sewri, Wadala and Sion.

From the earliest time, Bombay Island enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with Salsette Island to its north, stretching up to the mainland. In the initial period of British occupation, Salsette served as its agricultural hinterland and also functioned as a buffer between Bombay and the inland military powers. In 1774 the first Maratha war was fought as the British were desirous of obtaining possession of Salsette for supplies and defence. In the 20th century Salsette absorbed the inevitable overspill of Bombay's population and catered to the suburban expansion.

The islands were grouped along two parallel rocky ridges, which made their surface very uneven. They were finally welded into a single Bombay island by a long and gradual process of land reclamation which was completed in the nineteenth century. Originally the limited fertile area of Bombay was covered with groves of coconut and other palms, sparse rice
fields, vegetable gardens and fruit orchards, among which were scattered, the hamlets of fishermen and cultivators.

In 1853 the very first railway track in India was laid down from the Centre of Bombay city northeast to the twenty mile distant town of Thana and ten years later the track was extended to Poona through the mountainous terrain. Soon an extensive railway network joined Bombay with other major urban centres in the subcontinent. This was a revolutionary step in improving Bombay's communications.

The urban growth of Bombay had, from the outset, a clear and well defined nucleus, namely, the East India Company's fortified factory or trading establishment overlooking the harbour. Soon the town proper was settled in a rough semi circle around the castle and under its protection. **Land was acquired by removing fishermen's huts from the area and plots were laid out for the houses of settlers and merchants.** The town grew haphazardly and without a plan around a central open space known as the "Bombay Green" (today's Azad Maidan).

The only clear pattern was a conscious residential separation along broad ethnic lines. The "native town" and a bazaar in the northern section of the town and European residences in the southern section. Within each sector over the next two hundred and fifty years there was a further clustering in each sector, of ethnic (religious and linguistic - regional) conclaves along the lines of nationality, religion and caste.

The native town stretched westward from the harbour but not reaching the Backbay. Its northern extension was Kamathipura (a name it acquired from the Telegu word Kamathis or construction workers of Andhra Pradesh). The shoreline of the European section was lined with piers, docks, a marine store house and yard and the marine superintendent's house. These were all privately owned until 1873. The island city had a sizeable group of people connected with the harbour and docks. These were mostly men - Hindu, (56%) Muslims 28%, Christian 15% and Parsis 1%.

Beyond the 400 yard limit of the European sector, Indian dwelling houses appeared in a largely rural area. The marshes which occupied the large area at the centre of the island were reclaimed gradually throughout the 18th century. A cause way was built between Cumballa Hill and Worli to drain the great breach and reclaimed marshes were put under cultivation. Thus by the end of the 18th century, the five largest islands in the Bombay group formed a single island mass.

When the cotton mills arrived, they were initially located in a broad arc outside the native town. A few decades later they came to be concentrated near Parel. Railway workshops were also built in these areas. In order to accommodate the mainly single male labourer's, worker's "chawls" were built on a large scale.

In the case of Bombay, immigration accounted for the increase of population. From 1881 to 1931, only about one fourth of Bombay's inhabitants were born in the city itself and in times of prosperity which attracted a larger influx of immigrants, this proportion sank even further, as for example, to 16 per cent of the total in 1921.

The occupations which attracted this migration were connected with Bombay's major functions. In the first half of the twentieth century, over 30% of the work force was employed in Industry, of which the textile industry claimed the largest share. The largest proportion of immigrants, from the Konkan, the Deccan and the United Provinces (in the north) took to
industrial labour. The immigrants from Gujarat and Rajasthan were conspicuous in trade. The Goans were concentrated in domestic service.

The diverse religions and caste communities remained largely encapsulated and, in spite of being closely juxtaposed in Bombay's cosmopolitan setting, continued to maintain lifestyles which differed relatively little from those practiced in their respective regions of origin.

Over a period of time, the predominantly Hindu areas had moved westward and northward while the minorities were clustered in the southern and central parts of the city. The Muslims continue to show centripetal tendencies for clustering closer to their traditional strongholds of Chakla, Umarkhadi, Khara Talao and second Nagpada, near the city centre.

Industry was located near the periphery of the "native town", partly because of easy access to Indian labour and partly because, the noise and pollution made its presence incompatible with the European and affluent Indian residential areas.

**Administrative setup**

Between 1870 and 1880, consequent to the passing of a series of Acts, the Bombay Municipal Corporation was set up. In 1864 the first census of the island city was undertaken in order to gauge the abnormal population influx attracted by the cotton boom. In 1872 Bombay was subdivided into administrative wards, which were in turn subdivided into sections. Given the elongated shape of the island, the alignment of the major roads remained roughly north-south.

**Transport**

In 1974 horse drawn team cars were first introduced. Thirty years later the Bombay Electric Supply and Transport Undertaking (BEST) took over. The island city was traversed north to south by two railway lines.

**Housing for the industrial workers**

The chawls, the poorest form of multi-family housing, consisted usually of single rooms approximately of 100 square feet or occasionally, two room units. For all the variety in their appearance, construction and size, their sole object was the housing or "warehousing" of large numbers of labourers as cheaply as possible. It was estimated that 70% of the working class population in 1921 lived in chawls. In 1917-18 approximately 97% of the working class households in Parel were living in single rooms while it was not uncommon for several households to share a single room.

36% chawls were commonest in the industrial areas of Byculla, Tadco Wadi, Parel and Worli. 54% were near the city's mills and 19% near the workshops and foundries.

Even poorer types of accommodation were, semi-permanent sheds constructed of corrugated iron or any other available material such as flattened kerosene tins, wooden planks etc. At the lowest extreme, were huts fashioned out of dry palm leaves which were totally lacking in sanitary facilities and which were often shared with domestic animals.
4. Today the urban expanse of Bombay is considerable. At its core lies Bombay City, which is an island off the Konkan coast, with an area of about 69 square kilometers (or about 26.5 square miles) and a population of 3,285,040 at the 1981 Census. The suburban spillover is inevitably directed northward, given the site features and constraints, and an area of about 367 square kilometers (or about 142 square miles) which accommodates 4,969,215 people. While the city of almost 440 square kilometers and a population of about 8.3 million), a much larger unit designated the Bombay Metropolitan Region, which forms the basis for regional planning, includes an additional semicircular portion of the mainland across Bombay harbour, and has a total area of about 4,330 square kilometers and a population of 11,053,588. Within this region lies "New Bombay", a town planned as a counter-magnet to Bombay City by duplicating its port and commercial-industrial functions.

Bombay City (comprising Bombay Island) has existed as a municipal administrative unit since 1864, while the Suburban District was created in 1921 and has undergone several basic changes in areas and other respects since then.

"National Policy on Housing"

Allocation for Housing in the Seventh Plan.

Housing is a state subject but the union government is responsible for formulation of the National policy. The housing activity seeks to fulfill many of the fundamental objectives of the seventh plan viz providing shelter, raising the quality of life particularly of the poorer sections of the population. In the first plan, the total investment in housing was R.1,150 crores which was 34% of the total investment in the economy. Over the years, in quantitative terms, the public sector investment in housing has registered an increase by nearly 10 times. The housing outlay in the Seventh Plan stands at Rs.3,145 crores against the total investment of Rs.3,48,148 crores. This is 1.5% higher than the percentage of total investment under the sixth plan.

"Housing programmes in Maharashtra"

The government of Maharashtra announced several Housing Programmes from time to time. In 1988, it announced possibility of legislation for vacant land, in order to protect the rights of slum dwellers and also to check the proliferation of slums in Bombay. It also decided in some cases to have extra floor space index (FSI) and to allow the tenants of old buildings to own if on ownership basis, at subsidized rates.

LEGISLATIONS

Maharashtra slum areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment) 1971:
The slums can be improved and redeveloped by providing amenities such as water and electric supply etc.

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act 1976:
The exemptions in the public interest (Sec 20) and construction of dwelling for weaker sections (Sec 21).

Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act.
Maharashtra vacant lands (Prohibition of unauthorised occupation and summary eviction) Act 1987:
The act prohibited unauthorised occupation of vacant lands in urban areas in Maharashtra and provided for summary eviction of persons from such lands. The Act was first enacted in 1975 when there was Emergency in the country and fundamental rights were suspended.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF DHARAVI

1. Dharavi Today

Dharavi is known as one of the largest slums in Asia. Located today in the centre of Bombay, this settlement was on the outskirts of the city four decades ago when the poor migrant families first settled there in the late 1930’s.

Dharavi is situated in a low lying area which leads to large scale flooding every monsoon. The land is marshy and spans Bandra and Mahim in north-west Bombay and Sion in north-east Bombay. Apart from the density of population which is as much as 350 huts and 1,225 population per acre, there are an estimated 600,000 population in the 460 acres of marsh land. The residents live in conditions ranging from extreme squalor to minimum habitability.

Dharavi has 71 ration shops, 842 toilets and 162 water taps. It has 10 different kinds of commercial units including big, small scale leather and scrap recycling industries.

Growth of Dharavi

Fifty years ago, this area was a swamp surrounded with mangroves and coconut palms, a piece of land adjacent to Salsette island where the mangrove swamps were a sanctuary for birds. In bits and pieces, people seeking shelter sought refuge in marshy, undeveloped land nobody wanted. The marshy mud at its least dangerous depth went up to the knees.

The potters of Kumbharwada have been residents at what is now called Dharavi, for the last 50 years. Prior to this, the potters had been forced to leave the city limits by the British and had come and settled down at Dharavi. Around the same time, a few Muslim small-time businessmen from South Tirunelveli, built tanneries here, bringing skins from the Bandra abattoir. Sheepskins were taken there during the nights to be prepared in the morning. They could not get labour for the tanneries - it was filthy work which no one wanted to do. So their Tamilian mukadams (labour contractors) went to Tamil Nadu and brought back half starved workers from drought affected districts. It was only those desperate souls who were willing to work and live in such a filthy, foul smelling, pest ridden place. These men came without their families and lived in the tanneries themselves, eating, sleeping and working under those reeking hides. The mill owners lived away from the stench and appointed a few experienced mill owners from the South as overseers. Later, Dharavi was also populated when other slum areas were destroyed and the inhabitants driven out. The city grew around the slum colony and spread its tentacles even further.

By the late forties, the 175 hectare tract had only 5000 inhabitants. A few huts were strewn over the bog. Only one lane ran from the Mahim station. To enter Dharavi the inhabitants
formed a pathway by firming up the ground and carrying boulders which they placed over the mud pathway. Electricity was unheard-of in the huts. Dimly lit kerosene lamps cast more shadows than light. Only the lane to the station had civic bulbs. In those days, everyone strove to return before sunset. Those who worked overtime or had got detained due to other reasons, arrived at Mahim station and waited for a group to form before they ventured homewards, in the eerie darkness. Those days the women could only venture out in the dark to answer the call of nature, since in the morning the men would squat in the pit that served as the open toilet.

Over a period of time, Dharavi inherited a kind of negative fame. For many, the name conjures up a vision of huts, potters and tannery sheds side by side along open sewers, children playing in alleys so narrow that the sun does not reach down.

As the physical conditions here were so terrible, it was assumed by the authorities that, anyone who voluntarily lived in such a place must be up to no good and they must have something to hide. This impression became stronger, for none of the residents ventured outside the colony, inhibited as they were, by their inability to converse in the local language. No outsider came into this foul place. Besides, the people who worked in the tanneries were in those days the lowest castes. Slaughtering and skinning animals and tanning their skins was considered the most unclean of work available to man. In consequence those who practice it were considered unclean and often people pretended that these people did not exist at all. The smuggler-criminal nexus had taken roots in the adjacent location of Sion Kholiwada in the sixties. So, whenever there was a robbery or stabbing in the neighbourhood the police would round up suspects from Dharavi too. Everyone believed that any man who lived in Dharavi must be an anti-social element.

The police like everybody else, believed Dharavi was a hot bed of criminals. As they assumed that the poor wretches living in Dharavi were ruthless and dangerous, they beat and tortured them twice as cruelly. It was only a matter of time before the victims decided that they would no more take such treatment unprotestingly. Soon, there were reprisal killings of cops.

Meanwhile by the late 40's and early 50's another change was taking place. The migrant workers began bringing their families with them. They had realized that it was cheaper to set up house in Dharavi than to pay boarding and lodging in a "pongal" house (the name by which lodging houses for male workers were referred to in the Tamil language) in addition to sending money home.

In those days, wages in Dharavi were much higher than anywhere else in Bombay - they had to be, otherwise no one would have tolerated the living and working conditions there. And so families began settling in Dharavi, building their own shacks and branching out into other occupations unrelated to the tanneries.

By this time, the tanneries had themselves changed hands. They were taken over by the mukadams of yore, to whom virtually every Dharavi resident was indebted in some way. The more powerful men among them, had laid claim to the land around the tanneries, however illegal such claims might be in a court of law today. In fact, 40 acres of the land which are now listed as "private" in Dharavi land records, are those which were acquired by these local strongmen in earlier times. Families building houses, had to pay rent or hafta to those slumlords who between them controlled the whole area.
Over the years, huts sprang up biggledy piggledly with barely any space in between them for
building roads or drains. The essentially Tamil character of Dharavi was retained as the
migration chain from that state was strengthened. Most poor Tamilians who arrived in the
city, invariably found their way to Dharavi.

Till the end of sixties, all efforts to improve conditions within the slum were strictly
controlled by the slum lords. For such families as lived in the area, all services and facilities
such as water supply, electricity and shops were provided for, by these strongmen who
obtained illegal connections from power and water lines.

Every family in Dharavi had to pay chanda for whatever facilities the slum lords said they
would provide. There was no questioning, no accountability and of course, no redress. These
men were so feared that no one would dare to meet their eyes. Whatever the crisis or need - a
ration card, a job, medical treatment - you had to go to your local "dada". So there was no
tradition of self reliance or collective action in Dharavi. This centralized leadership was
reinforced by political parties who gave the slum lords political patronage in exchange for
votes. No one cared for the condition of the place or the people and people were too weak and
afraid to change anything.

A permanent lack of housing and complete absence of municipal planning resulted in
Dharavi’s receiving immigration from other states in India. But the settlements were illegal. BMC refused persistently to regard these migrants as
anything but occasional visitors to the city and neglected elementary municipal facilities such
as water, electricity and sewerage. On the other hand, they collected a kind of rent for land, some tens of rupees a year. This rent is
now an argument for the dwellers in their fight for a legalization of the settlement.

But a radical change did come in the early seventies through the intervention of a dynamic
and honest young municipal councillor, supported by some enlightened local people like
Tenni and Chellaya. In a unique attempt at self development and without the assistance of the
scores of welfare organisations which had set up shop in Dharavi by this time, they carried
out the first ever numbering of houses, relocated huts in a more orderly manner in order to
permit the construction of pathways and drains, organised groups of households into chawl
committees and divided the total locality into 64 divisions or nagars. Photo passes were
issued to each householder by the Bombay Municipal Corporation. The formation of chawl committees to tackle local problems and needs was the first tentative
step at democratization in Dharavi and the first sign of the people's participation in their own
development.

The formation of chawl committees to tackle local problems radically cut into the power, thus
far held by the slum lords. Dharavi in a way, began developing into a more habitable place.
The indomitable power of the slumlords waned surprisingly fast, in the wake of these
changes and their economic stronghold was broken as people stopped paying hafta to them.

Chawl and nagar committees brought in, a new era in Dharavi's history. No matter how
grossly inadequate, authorized electrical connections, drainage, toilets and a few government
welfare schemes were obtained for the people. On the debit side, however (Chellaya
president of one of the first chawl committees) notes that a number of so called social
organizations, created along narrow religious, regional and caste lines backed by powerful
political parties and local business interests, also sprang up at this time, resulting in a
complex web of patronage and loyalty which subsequently, impeded progressive forces in
Dharavi. Since then, the people are split three ways as they identify with these organizations alone or with their own nagars alone or with both, instead of with Dharavi as a whole.

The formation of nagar committees also were, in some instances, subverted for personal gain, by individuals who became akin to the slum lords of yore and looked upon the nagar councils as their private fiefdom. One commonly quoted example is that of the Gandhi Nagar society which was formed as early as 1976. The chief promoter, it is said, collected initial amounts ranging from Rs.500 to Rs.8,000 from members. Yet, to date, not a single meeting of the society has been called nor have elections been held. When the gentleman was asked by the members to present the accounts and discuss the progress of the society, the latter resorted to threats and other intimidating tactics.

2. Redevelopment of Dharavi

In 1976, the then Bombay Municipal Corporation president had mooted the idea of reconstructing regular tenements in the place of the existing slums on municipal lands.

Some years later, Charles Correa, the renowned architect was asked to form a committee, to deliberate on the redevelopment of Dharavi. In 1985 the Correa committee submitted a report stating that the basic issues involved in Dharavi were, inadequacy of infrastructure and unsatisfactory shelters and their immediate surroundings. The committee recommended two levels of development. One, the area level scheme and two, the block level scheme.

Under the area level scheme improvements in structural services like storm water drains, water supply, sewerage and resurfacing of roads was recommended as necessary. At the block level, it was suggested that upgradation of existing hutments be undertaken. The recommendations included land tenure to cooperative societies, improvements of the on-site infrastructure, provisions for community toilets and shelter improvements.

3. Prime Minister’s Grant Programme (PMGP)

In December 1985 during the Congress Centenary celebration, Rajiv Gandhi announced a grant of Rs.100 crore to improve the housing conditions of low income groups. Of this amount Rs.37 crore was allotted to Dharavi, Rs.41 crores for urban renewal and Rs.22 crore for a slum upgradation program.

The grant for Dharavi was supplemented by Rs.65 crore sanction from public finance institutions and another Rs.20 crore from contributions from the residents. Bringing the total availability of finance for redeveloping Dharavi to Rs.122. The Central and State grants were allocated from non-planned expenditure. The formulation of the Prime Minister’s Grant Programme (PMGP) took one year. It was constituted for a period of three years only. The main thrust of development work envisaged in the master plan drawn up by the PMGP team of architects relied heavily on the recommendations of the Correa Committee report.

As the authorities felt that a hut by hut count would take five years, the National Remote Sensing Agency, Hyderabad was requested in 1986 to undertake an aerial survey at the cost of Rs.4.5 lakhs. The seven panels were mapped by the Pune regional office of the survey of India. Photographs taken were drawn on a 1:1000 scale and shows the layout of hutments, internal road patterns, locations of both hutments and permanent buildings etc.
PMGP officials, admitted that the photographs enabled them to make property surveys but a major problem was that since almost all roofs of hutments were sloped, shadows were imprinted on the photographs. Due to this, surveyors could not ascertain the exact number of huts.

Anyway, the PMGP estimated that the population of Dharavi was 2.5 to 3 lakh besides a floating population of 20,000. Their estimates showed that the total number of families in Dharavi were 53,000.

The master plan took into account the needs of 43,000 families only. PMGP decided that the remaining 10,000 families would have to be relocated elsewhere, outside Dharavi along with tannery sheds, junk yards and workshops.

Redevelopment was to be done in three phases:
1. Slum upgradation
2. Building of transit camps
3. Relocation of some people in other sites.

The main thrust of the Dharavi plan is slum upgradation and reconstruction. Both involve leasing land to residents, formation of cooperative societies and PMGP assistance towards provision of civic amenities in case of slum upgradation and housing loans in the case of reconstruction programmes.

The PMGP had formulated what they termed, as their people's participation program. According to this program the people would be encouraged to form cooperative societies.

Secondly, each tenement would be of 180 square feet. Thirdly the estimate cost of each tenement was worked out as Rs.45,000. Fourthly the financing for the tenement, was split three ways:
1. The members' contribution of Rs.12,500 each
2. The PMGP subsidy of Rs.5,400
3. PMGP interest free loan of Rs.27,100.

The repayment of the loan over a period of 20 years was worked out at approximately Rs.150/- per month which the PMGP felt was feasible for the residents.

For the formation of cooperatives the PMGP put forward 3 prerequisites. These were:
1. The cut off year for eligibility was 1985. Every member was required to prove his domicile status through the electoral rolls and ration cards.
2. Members were required to clear all outstanding arrears in rent payable to BMC. They needed to acquire a clearance certificate from the BMC.
3. The societies had to be registered.

The PMGP drew up plans for the building of multi storeyed tenements with the intention of housing a larger number of families. Their plans including open space for play grounds, two post offices, community toilets, schools etc. There was also talk of building a new telephone exchange in the vicinity. The PMGP was to play the part only of a facilitator while the actual implementing bodies were MHADA, BMC and BMRDA.

The Bombay Metropolitan Region Development Authority (BMRDA) was allotted 2 crores to deepen and widen the Mithi river which cuts across Dharavi. The BMC was given 18 crores
for building infrastructure like storm water drain, water electricity. 17 crores was given to the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority for housing. The MHADA scheme consists of a slum upgradation program (SUP) and a reconstruction program to be implemented through cooperative housing societies.

The floor index space (FSI) that PMGP originally allowed for, was 10 feet. Later, when the municipal authorities decided to permit an increase in FSI to 14 feet, the earlier limit was enhanced.

The limits regarding types of construction work legally permissible were adopted as per specifications regarding wall thickness, heights and loft under the official permit of the Brihan Mumbai Mahanagar Palika local municipal ward. In 1987 the Bombay Provincial Municipal Councils Act was amended to enable the Municipal Corporation to lease lands to slum dwellers at concessional or nominal rates. This was important for those Dharavi residents who were to be shifted outside Dharavi.

4. Response of Residents to Prime Minister Grant Project Plans:
At first, residents of Dharavi evinced little interest in the PMGP, inured as they are to empty political promises. But when they witnessed the crystallizing of the Dharavi master plan into something more tangible than ministerial assurances and with various schemes involving a lot of money being floated, they realized that something was being done even if their own involvement was not being taken into account.

In the earlier section on the growth of Dharavi, mention has been made of Dharavi, having been reorganized in the seventies. As a consequence of which numerous committees, nagars loyalties and vested interests had mushroomed. Some of the older residents got together and formed the Dharavi Vikas Samiti, in order to activate a wider level of people's participation in the master plan which when implemented would seriously affect individual families in both economic terms and in terms of dislocation.

The Dharavi Vikas Samiti who are members of the National Slum Dwellers Federation got in touch with SPARC, a social welfare organization, which had made news in 1985 when they had published the findings of the census survey that they had undertaken of pavement dwellers in E ward and all the arterial roads upto Mahim. The interaction among the three organizations led to -

1. The formation of a forum which helped creating greater awareness of PMGP.
2. In the generation of statistics on Dharavi's families, population and commerce
3. In the formation of cooperative societies which were totally by the members and for the members.
4. Provided a forum which could raise queries about PMGP's arbitrary decisions, advocate for plans which were more people friendly and highlight for the people concerned and the authorities, anomalies and difficulties that were faced by the people.

The issues raised were primarily three -
1. The statistics that were generated by the authorities.
2. They feasibility of the multi-storeyed and gentrification plans for the residents.
3. The affordability of the tenements as worked out by the PMGP.
4. The FSI that was being strictly adhered to.
5. The whole implementation of the project and the costs thereof to the people. The anomalies and the unfairness.

Statistics

PMGP had arrived at the figure of 53,000 families and a population of 3 lakhs. DVS made a survey on a house to house, nagar by nagar basis and came up with a count of 80,518 huts, 166,045 families and a total population of 530,225.

The wide gap in statistics between PMGP figures and DVS represents two issues. One, is that the manner of collection of governmental statistics is so perfunctuary that it is less concerned with reflecting reality than with completing a job undertaken by it. Second, is that these same statistics then go on to becoming sacrosanct for all subsequent programmes targeted towards the censused group. The latter is particularly negative as a sub group amongst the censused group is kept outside the purview of the programme not because they do not belong; not because they are not requiring to be targeted, but only because they accidentally happen to have been left out during census collection. In this particular case it could also mean that their eligibility for becoming members of the cooperative societies would be questioned. Further they would be categorized under those that must leave the premises of the redeveloped Dharavi. Finally they would fall outside the group of dislocated who were to be given help in resettling elsewhere. The human face of this fall out is that as the law of the jungle prevails, the weakest and the poorest of Dharavi’s residents would become the most vulnerable and worst affected by the scheme as the clever and well off would corner all the facilities for themselves and overcome obstacles like having been left out of the census count.

The relocation site for the tanneries was given out as vacant land near the Chembur abattoir. The tannery owners were not unhappy as transport costs for them would be lowered. As it transpired later, the land which the PMGP was promoting had been sold off to Tatas by the owners, in the meanwhile. How the lack of this advances information would have affected the tanneries was that while their evacuating Dharavi would have been accomplished, their subsequent relocation may or may not have been advantageous to them. Besides, when dealing with a faceless government, there is no identifiable agency where they could have sought redressal.

The crowning irony was the shifting of the leather industry to the new location and the dislocation it would wreak in the lives of the very families who originally turned Dharavi from inhospitable marshy land to a livable habitation.

The fall out from the selective relocation of certain industries would also mean a disruption to one group of families whose residence and work space were closely linked and to another group who laboured in these industries and who consequent to the redevelopment would either find themselves dislocated or having to allocate commuting expenditure between Dharavi and the location where the industry they work in, has been relocated.

The simultaneous collection of census data by DVS triggered off several positive outcomes. Firstly, the people realized the importance of playing the game along the rules set by the government. They were in possession of facts and figures which they could use to counter the government’s own arguments. To bolster their figures, they appended ration card numbers and checked out the names in the electoral rolls. This gave the case they were putting forth a more fool proof context.
In collecting hard facts on the commercial units functioning in the area, the Dharavi Vyavsai Ekta Sangh was in a position to make its own assessment of how PMGP would affect their commercial units and devise ways of protecting the interests of those who worked for them.

From the beginnings of the Dharavi settlement, a system of boarding and lodging for single male labourers had been evolved in the form of "ponga" houses. The DVES extended their protection to these single males.

As a fall out of the reorganizing of Dharavi in the seventies the people had over a period of time grown to identify not with Dharavi as a whole but to their nagars, societies or other sectarian sub groups. The result of this enumeration of the residents and the expansion of DVS functions led to the creation of a forum wherein leadership from different loyalties made common cause and identified with Dharavi as a whole in the context of the implications of the PMGP for its residents.

PMGP had envisaged the construction of a five storey structure wherein ground coverage would be less.

DVS suggested that 5 storeys would be impractical for the residents for several reasons. First and foremost, DVS expected that it would be a matter of five years at the most, before the water scarcity problem facing the rest of Bombay would hit Dharavi, inconveniencing especially all those who reside on the fourth and fifth floor. Again, in time honoured functioning of the law of the jungle, the older and less vocal members of the societies would find themselves with allotments on the upper floors. Thus this group would be inconvenienced even more when the water scarcity prevents water from flowing from their taps.

DVS also felt that the open spaces proposed by PMGP would be liable to fall victim of encroachment leading to FSI and density violations.

PMGP proposed to include toilets within individual tenements. DVS rejected this as middle class culture arguing that individual toilets was not part of the slum culture. They proposed one toilet for every five tenements. DVS suggested that toilet space in a 180 sq.ft. floor space would not only be an encroachment on living space for the family but also aesthetically repugnant as the kitchen and toilet space would be adjacent and alien to India purification values.

PMGP had originally created 3 slabs for tenement size 160 sq.ft. 180 sq.ft. and 220 sq.ft. To build a toilet within the 160 and 180 sq.ft. tenements, would result in not only invading an individual family member's privacy but would leave little space for movement.

DVS architects drew up a counter architectural proposal of a structure which would rise to three floors and high ground coverage making encroachment on the ground unlikely. DVS structure also envisaged a pocket terrace on the second floor which would serve the community in several ways. It would be a safe open space for women to gather and children to play and during festive occasions would serve as space for organising the festivity - be it a marriage or a religious get together.
Another issue in the construction plan which exorcised DVS was the question of PMGP construction not including the building of a loft within the tenements. This was linked also to the original permissible height of 10 ft. PMGP authorities in fact looked at this whole issue from a highly questionable stand of supposed ethics. They propounded the theory that lofts are used for sub tenancy purposes. Besides the presence of a loft permits families to allow relatives to come and stay for extended periods of time if not on a permanent basis. Such familial arrangements would lead to violations of permissible density and consequently strain civic amenities.

The most questionable premise of this official assumption is that the poor unlike their better off counterparts are more dishonest and intractable. The second assumes nuclear families as the most popular urban family types. This assumption flies in the face of well known facts of family and kinship norms and loyalties which encourage and prioritize families to support extensions of the nuclear unit.

Finally, the non-human face of such an argument is, that given the average size of 5 members per family which has been statistically proved, the extra space of a loft would provide the family with just that little extra but valuable space for living in less cramped circumstances.

The redevelopment of Dharavi as envisaged by the Correa committee brings into question an even more important aspect of the scheme which would be true of all such slums. As a matter of administrative policy from the beginning of the growth of Bombay, there were one class of citizens who always lived on the periphery. These people were usually very poor and provided services or manufactured items which were indispensable to the well off patrons of their services and manufacture. When the existing city demanded expansion the general rule was that this same peripheral group would be forced to move to a wider peripheral ring in order to make way for development for the first class of citizens.

In Dharavi's case Bombay grew around and beyond Dharavi. Today, Dharavi exists on prime land which is lavishly eyed by builders, speculators and gentry alike. The Correa plan, well meaning as it might well be, also opens mouth watering vistas for the gentry of the city in its basic concept of gentrification. Gentrification as we understand the term, is the redevelopment of a site in a manner which makes the site in keeping with middle class environments.

The moment redevelopment makes a site viable for the middle class it is natural that offers by them to buy out tenements would begin.

On the flip side, resettlement leads to expenditure for the poor (in the purchasing of tenements built on their behalf) which is incompatible with either their earnings or their saving capacity. Besides the middle class are able to offer to buy out the poor at rates which are double what the poor have been asked to pay for the tenement. The poor are as much prone to temptation as their well off counterparts. This leads to an exchange which leaves the poor right where he was prior to the resettlement scheme - on the footpath, in another slum.

A major question that is raised is development for whom? It is important. DVS felt that when Dharavi was a marsh, the original settlers made it habitable over a period of time. This was done through the diligent labour and enterprise of the migrants. Land was hardened, depressions were filled in, huts and roads were built - through the sweat of free labour and expenditure incurred by the inhabitants on their own behalf.
Though the BMC would not acknowledge either their efforts or the legality of their tenements (thereby providing for civic amenities) they had no qualms about collecting rent for usage of vacant land. To the extent that, at the time of PMGP implementation, they were actually demanding full payment of rental arrears prior to the registration of the societies.

Despite the much touted people's participatory program the whole scheme was formulated in a manner which could lead to large numbers of the residents being dislocated. DVS questioned proposals to make space for recreation grounds and other public service structures which would push several residents out of Dharavi. Dharavi did require help for restructuring buildings and more civic amenities. But anything which was at the cost of the people seemed to them to be anti poor strategies and unfair practices.

On the criticism that conventional town planning is not possible for Dharavi, PMGP authorities stated that the master plan was drawn up to ensure that the width of roads was reduced from the accepted 12 metres to nine metres and that only 15 per cent of the space had been left as open land for playgrounds and parks.

One other important issue is that under the new scheme, people will get no compensation for the market value of the house they already have, the asset in which they have invested heavily for so many years. So even though the market value of a zhopda in Dharavi is Rs.50,000 this asset will be wiped out with the new plan and people will have to start from zero with an additional debt of Rs.45,000 hanging over their heads.

The affordability of the tenements upon fulfillment of all PMGP requirements was differently calculated by PMGP and DVS. The various headings of expenditure for acquisition of tenements are the following:

1. The payment of rental arrears to BMC prior to procuring a clearance certificate from them.
2. People's initial contribution to the construction costs.
3. The expenditure incurable on registration of societies.
4. The total cost of tenement as estimated by PMGP which is at variance with DVS estimates.
5. The installment amount repayable on the monthly basis by the owners of tenements over a period of time.

Lastly, the unaccredited cost incurred by the people in repeat trips made to the concerned authorities for fulfillment of eligibility requirements, repayments of loans taken at exorbitant market rates for payment of rental arrears and/or contribution to the construction costs and finally the cost of the waiting period between dismantling of their present structure (and its implications on their economic lives) and the occupation of their restructured tenement.

Financial implications

PMGP had envisaged that loans would be given to the residents for building and construction.

For regularisation under SUP, a down payment of Rs.251/- had to be made and the rest of the Rs.1,800 would be recovered in 20 years at the rate of Rs.20/- per month. After registration, the members were entitled to house improvement loans upto Rs.5000/- repayable in 20 years.
In the reconstruction programme, each family would have to pay Rs.5,000 initially, towards the cost of each self contained flat of 180 sq.ft. which worked out to Rs.37,500/- Rs.5,400/- was to be generated from cross subsidies. Rs.20,000 loan would be granted by HUDCO or HDFC and the rest as interest free loan from PMGP.

PMGP estimated that each tenement would cost Rs.45,000/- and the monthly repayment of loans would amount to approximately Rs.150/- which according to it, was feasible for the residents.

At first, the residents were under the impression that they would have to seek loans from the nationalised banks. These banks provide loans at 12-14 per cent. It meant, therefore that each family would have had to pay Rs.1,500/- per month, which was laughable considering the monthly earnings of the poor.

Later HUDCO agreed to floating loans at 7 per cent interest.
DVS's point was that by the time the houses were ready, the costs were bound to escalate and no tenement would cost less than Rs.45,000/- with the initial deposit moving up from Rs.5,000/- to Rs.7,000/- The loan schemes offered would result in people paying upto Rs.80,000 if one included the interest and the cost of amenities and upkeep. The repayment amount in such an eventuality would rise to Rs.200/- per month which was ill affordable for a majority of Dharavi residents.

Over and above this expenditure regularisation was done after each member had paid rental arrears and the penalty of Rs.500/- to the BMC. As almost 50 per cent of the residents had accumulated arrears since 1976, for a sizeable number payment of arrears was going to require resources which could only be available to them after borrowing the money from a money lender at very high interest rates.

The alternate DVS proposal for reconstruction, on the other hand, envisages a ground plus one structures that will cost Rs.30,000 with construction costs being cut by using cement from the controlled market, dispensing with outside contractors and pile foundation and the society members themselves buying raw materials. Space in each nagar would be used according to the needs and suggestions of its residents instead of imposing similar structures throughout Dharavi.

Multi storeyed buildings are not suitable for, average Dharavi dwellers who are fishermen, vegetable vendors or tannery workers and those who can't carry their equipment to upper storeyed floors. DVS has drawn up alternative schemes in which tanneries can be zoned off and their owners and families allowed to remain.

PMGP's multi storeyed concept was to cram 156 families in a carpet area of 180 sq.ft. DVS has asked for 92 families to be accommodated with the height of the building being cut down to ground plus one upper. This ensures an additional loft space which works out to 300 sq.ft. per feet without violating any laws like FSI.

**DHARAVI REDEVELOPMENT PLAN**

In December 1985, on the occasion of the Congress Centenary celebrations, Rajiv Gandhi announced a grant of Rs.100 crore to improve the housing conditions of low income groups. The financial commitment added fillip to the redevelopment scheme for Dharavi,
which had been worked out on the basis of a report submitted by Mr. Correa. It took over a year to be formulated. The PMGP's term itself was for 3 years only.

In 1985 Charles Correa submitted his report with recommendations from a study group headed by him, for developing a master plan for Dharavi. The main thrust of development work for Dharavi, according to the Correa report, is on two levels; Area level work which would comprise upgradations of infrastructure like storm water drainage, water supply, sewerage, resurfacing of roads and creation of parks and playgrounds. Block level upgradation which involves the creation of cooperative housing societies and provisions for community toilets. It was on the basis of this that the Dharavi redevelopment scheme was drawn up.

The scheme stated that Dharavi itself is located in what is now prime real estate land in Bombay, situated as it is between the Western and Central railway lines, it connects South and Central Bombay with North Bombay.

Therefore, the tanneries which occupy a lot of space would be shifted out to a space near the Deonar abattoir as recommended by the Correa report. Other polluting industries, huge junk yards etc. would also be shifted out. The Khumbarwada, a potters colony would however stay behind, along with a section of the ready made garment manufacturing colony, papad making colony etc.

Given Dharavi's space constraints, the scheme envisaged that infrastructure of the "best quality" should be provided for a limited population of 3 lakh with facilities to match the corresponding increase in population.

An aerial survey of Dharavi was done as it was absolutely necessary for obtaining some idea of the logistics of Dharavi, as manually mapping every hut and by lane would have taken too long.

The aerial survey was conducted by the National Remote Sensing Agency Hyderabad in October 1987 at a cost of Rs. 4.16 lakh. After processing, the results had to be cleared by the Defence Ministry before they could be released.

The seven panels were mapped by the Pune regional office of the Survey of India. Photographs taken were drawn on a 1:1000 scale and show the layout of hutments, internal road patterns, locations of hutments and permanent buildings etc. The photographs did aid in property surveys but a major problem was that since almost all roofs of the hutments were sloped, shadows were the printed on the photographs. Due to this, surveyors could not ascertain exact dimensions from the photographs.

The cooperative housing societies were planned either along the ground or as 3 storeyed structures. By the end of redevelopment it was anticipated that there would be 50,000 flats coming up, parks and playgrounds, civic amenities like water, sewerage, a telephone exchange and two post offices.

Allocations

Rajiv Gandhi announced a grant of Rs. 100 crore. After a tussle between the state and central governments, the grant in the form of a non plan expenditure was divided into Rs. 37 crore for
the development of Dharavi; Rs.41 crores for "urban renewal" and Rs.22 crore for a "slum upgradation programme." The grant for Dharavi was to be supplemented by Rs.65 crore from the residents contributions, totaling Rs.122 crores. There were three government agencies charged with disbursing the Rs.37 crore.

Eligibility Criteria

The cut off year for residentship was fixed at 1985. A prerequisite was that all arrears of rent to the BMC be paid. The third criteria was the formation of registered cooperative societies.

PMGP Strategy

The main thrust of the Dharavi plan was slum upgradation and reconstruction. Both involved the leasing of land to residents, formation of cooperative societies and PMGP assistance towards provision of civic amenities in the case of slum upgradation and housing loans in the case of reconstruction programmes. 1500 residents were expected to come under the slum upgradation plan.

Bureaucrats have consistently maintained that Dharavi's population is in the range of 2.5 to 3 lakh, whereas an extensive survey by Dharavi Vikas Samiti put the figure to 5 lakhs. One estimate of the population is about 2.89 lakh and perhaps a floating population of about 20,000, we have estimated 53000 families in all.

As such the PMGP master plan took into account the needs of 43000 families only of their estimated total, intending that the remaining 10,000 families would be resettled elsewhere outside Dharavi. The displacement of 10,000 families would be done on the basis of those who came in after 1985 and more important all those who come in the way of laying infrastructure like surfacing and widening of roads, laying sewers etc. Of the 10,000 families, roughly half reside near the railway tracks and under the power lines on land belonging to the Tata Electric Company. The plan was to leave them undisturbed till the land they were occupying was required by the respective authorities.

The PMGP's policy was based on reconstruction which again depended entirely on the people's capacity to pay. The slum upgradation programme in contrast consisted of the formation of societies of residents in various areas and provision of civic amenities for them.

Under SUP a down payment of Rs.25/ had to be made and the rest of the Rs.18,000 was expected to be recovered in 20 years at the rate of Rs.20 a month.

The land lease was to be given to them after some basic amenities were constructed and there was one toilet available for every four families. After registration, the members were to be entitled to house improvement loans up to Rs.5000 repayable in 20 years. But the onus of running the society and maintaining it would be on them.

In the reconstruction programme each family would have to pay Rs.5000 initially towards cost of each self contained flat of 180 sq. m. which is Rs.37,500. Rs.5400 would generated from cross subsidies. Rs.20,000 would be on loan from HUDCO or HDFC and the rest as interest free loan from PMGP. This was only for those who could afford the down payment. About 2400 families had opted for it.
Another aspect of this scheme was conversion from rental to ownership basis after formation of cooperative housing society which became too prohibitive for residents of the buildings most of whom belonged to middle and lower class groups. Due to these the PMGP has devised a scheme of cross subsidies wherein members of the old tenement could buy additional area of about 90 sq.ft. Old residents could also make down payments with double the construction costs creating further subsidies. It was hoped that this would keep the total amount to be paid per month at Rs.180 inclusive of civic taxes.

Earlier any displacement of slum dwellers included development of pitches at the alternate site and Rs.10,000 from the agency requiring the land. Now cooperative society on an ownership basis were permitted to stress on two down payments of Rs.5000 each and Rs.16000 loan from HUDCO to be routed through the PMGP. This was to be paid back at the rate of Rs.150 per month for 16 years.

An open window to facilitate less cumbersome registration of societies was created.

PMGP Target Status

In 1987, only 39.85 crores of the 50 crore remitted by the Centre had been spent. In order to meet the stipulation of utilizing the total grant amount by the end of every financial year, the state government was required to spend Rs.60 crores in he seven months prior to the ending of the financial year. Yet the state government had still to receive its allotted grant amount of 50 crores. There was apprehension that the amount would not be disbursed as the central budget had not allocated for the amount.

In the same years BMC had been allocated 18 crores. In the first three months it had spent only 4.5 crores in providing for infrastructural facilities for Dharavi. BMC’s projections for expenditure to be incurred in the financial year was projected as only 12 crores.

PMGP envisaged the setting up of cooperatives housing societies for about 25,000 families. In the first year it had managed to form only three societies comprising 373 families. 10,000 families had given names for 92 proposed societies.

A major hurdle in forming societies was that most residents had defaulted in payment of arrears of rents to the BMC, most of them dating back to 1976. Arrears of rent and a penalty of Rs.500 had to be borne by the people if they were to be regularized. This had to be cleared. Towards this end the PMGP had prevailed upon the BMC to delegate responsibility of collecting at least 50 per cent areas to the ward offices instead of the deputy municipal commissioner, as per normal practice.

There were also a number of transfer cases where the photo pass holders had transferred their tenements and these cases were also time consuming. Unless regularisation were complete societies could not be eligible for registrations.

the land owning authority which is responsible for regularisation is in most cases the BMC and the Collectorate.

Problems faced by the people

Residents of Dharavi are running from pillar to post for loans for the down payments and some of them have borrowed on high interest rates.
Social workers act as clerks, forwarding registration papers. There is no awareness created by them and no interaction with the community. The people still do not know what the amount of the loans is, the interest rates and what installments have to be paid.

Another major task that the PMGP has undertaken is to widen the 90 ft. road running along Dharavi by accommodating present encroaches along the side of the road itself. This plan at first ran into some trouble as vested interests objected to the relocation of encroachers along the road.

However, 25 metre strips on both sides of the road will be widened and the 2200 odd hutments will be accommodated. According to PMGP about 585 metres have been encroached.

Major hurdles for the people

On the surface level the issues involved are three fold: The kind of housing that Dharavi needs; the affordability of such construction; and the most suitable means of allocating space so that it does not result in the displacement of families. But at a deeper level, what is in the reckoning is the ability of people to participate in their own development.

1. NSDF has through door to door surveys conducted since 1987 come up with a figure of 80,000 families resident in Dharavi. PMGP's estimate is 38,000. Work has started on 1800 tenements but another major problem has been accommodation for those residing 'pongal houses'. These are mainly boarding houses which shelter single men. Sub tenants occupy lofts of tenements.

2. PMGP reconstructed tenements estimated cost Rs.45000 with an initial investment of not less than Rs.7000 and loans that will have to be repaid at Rs.200 a month, are not affordable by the majority of Dharavi's residents.

3. Multistoreyed buildings are not suitable for the average Dharavi dwellers who are fishermen, vegetable vendors or tannery workers. They cannot carry their equipment to upper floors.

4. The setting up of cooperative housing society hinges on area per resident apart from loft space. The minimum offered was only 180 sq.ft. The height was fixed at 10 feet.

5. Old residents of repair and reconstruction buildings view the urban renewal program with the utmost suspicion. The higher rate of payment (at least double the rent they would have to pay) and duration of payment being about 25 years have deterred many from joining the project.

1. Cooperative housing societies are under construction. It has not been easy to get people to agree to move especially since the space they occupy is used both for residential and commercial activity.

2. A major breakthrough was getting tannery owners to accept a shift to Deonar - Mankhurd. Those involved in commercial "non confirming use" activity including manufacture of soaps and chemicals, hitherto resisting a move, may agree to shift following a major fire in the area.
3. The first hitches came with a controversy as to the exact population of Dharavi.

4. Then debate over the kind of tenements - whether ground floor structures, prefabricated, cooperatives etc. and resistance by commercial owners to shift elsewhere.

5. All these decades it is we who dwell dharavi - nobody else cared. Now they want to walk in and tell us how everything should be, without understanding anything about the realities here. The projects problem is that they have not studied our situation properly or formulated clear cut policies. They themselves have no idea how to proceed. They keep saying want people's participation but they decide everything - how much area each house should have, what it will cost, that we have high rise tenements, parks and gardens.

6. Another ticklish problem has been to identify authentic residents. Most residents of the present day transit camps have stayed in Bombay generation as the Bombay Housing Board has delayed repairs and reconstruction.

Some transit camps have become dens of vice and house persons with fake documents. The preparation of a master list of genuine transit camp residents is presently on.

7. Over the last few years, the builders market has entered Dharavi. Both builders and architects have been appointed without consulting the people of Dharavi and usually in collusion with the PMGP officials.

8. Extra FSI reserved for special projects (1.5) has not been made available to individual families but to Dharavi as a whole. Higher rates of interest for building tenements have given the people the fear that they may not be able to pay back the loans and may be served with eviction notices on expiry of the loan period.

9. At least 42 cooperative societies for which all formalities have been completed have not been registered yet.

10. The role of BMC vis a vis PMGP has also not been clearly defined. The former being the land owning authority leases the land to the societies through the PMGP. But in most instances the Shiv Sena dominated general body of the BMC refers back all items which come up on cooperative societies.

The BMC has also not prioritized the task of providing civic amenities to Dharavi residents. Only recently it was decided to hand over 10,000 huts to the civic authorities for SUP with a grant from PMGP.

11. For the ordinary residents of Dharavi an open window would be a great help in channelising all documentary work with various agencies.

12. PMGP has made provisions for flats of 160 sq.ft, 180 sq.ft. and 220 sq.ft. What is the need for creating three different slabs. Two post offices already exist. Why create more? Why does the telephone exchange have to be located here.
13. Obtaining a loan from any public finance institution has been the biggest stumbling block so far. While the PMGP is supposed to channelise grants upto Rs.60 crores from public institutions the rate of interest is too high.

14. 1987 - 11 members of M.S. have already sold their plots for higher prices.

15. The Balaji society's troubles typifies a major problem faced by the society work and PMGP officials - ascertaining the antecedents of residents. According to the members of the society the chief promoter has given membership to persons who have purchased hutments in the area even in 1988.

Gandhi Nagar chief promoter Gopalan connives with PMGP officials. Gopalan began working with PMGP officials to secure loans and get building plans approved. The members should only learnt that one Ranjit Naik and associate were the architects appointed by the chief promoter.

The Gandhi nagar society ran into trouble as some private builder wanted to reconstruct tenements free of charges and sell surplus buildings to the open market. The BMC however did not approve this plan as all attempts are made to provide accommodation for Dharavi residents rather than outsiders.

16. There were sharp differences between PMGP and the 83 members of M.S. over allotment of land. PMGP asks us to begin the construction after which we will be granted lease on the land. But suppose the BMC turns against us after the building comes up?

**PMGP STRATEGY**

**1989**

So far only a transit camp has been constructed at Dharavi housing about 800 families in its 1292 rooms.

Work has begun on 450 tenements and is expected to be completed by March 1990.

The allotments are made to chief promoters who are local dadas or people with political clout and they have a number of flats in various names. People living outside Dharavi are also being given allotments. The process has been made arbitrary and the aim of the government is just to achieve targets. In the process government has not allowed a dialectical process.

If you fit a toilet, kitchen and living space in one room of 160 or 180 there will be no privacy or space to more about.

PMGP's arguments is that a carpet area of 180 sq.ft. results in a built up area of 240 sq.ft.

**1989**

Housing department decided to permit 14 ft. height to solve housing problem.

280 crore available with state housing department from World Bank for slum upgradation.

Facilities to be extended uptil 1985.

Another member suggested bond for not setting property for 20 years. PEOPLE'S PARTICIPATION
They say there are only two lakh people here but the NSDF survey estimates at least double that number. So in other words they will plan everything as they like and we are supposed to participate whether their plans make sense or not.

Each house in the colony will cost Rs.45,000. The banks are going to provide loans want 12 to 14% interest and repayment in 10 years. This means that if you include monthly outgoings, each family will have to pay around Rs.1500 per month. So how are we supposed to eat? When we ask why we can't get loans at lower interest rates from HUDCO, they say HUDCO does not give loans to low income groups. But when we meet individual HUDCO representative, they did not say anything - only that no agreements had as yet been worked out with the project. Is this planning. Is this participation.

What no one realizes is that under the new scheme people will get no compensation for the market value of the house they already have, the asset in which they have invested heavily for so many years. So even though the market value of a jhopda in Dharavi is Rs.50,000 this asset will be wiped out with the new plan and people have to start from zero with another debt of Rs.45000 hanging over their heads. In fact with the current loan schemes being offered, we estimated that people will actually end up by paying nearly 80,000 for a house if you include the interest and the cost of amenities and upkeep. Many poor families have therefore panicked and begun selling their present dwellings for whatever they can get and have moved to other slums. They feel that they are losing the entire value of their present asset and then paying more than they can afford for a new one - all in the name of people's participation and slum redevelopment.

DVS is unanimous in the belief that this project will succeed only in driving the major of the poor in Dharavi out of the "redeveloped" colony. Unable to repay loans and meet living expenses, than will soon sell their tenements to lower middle or middle class buyers and start the whole cycle all over again in some other nascrant Dharavi.

The people have demanded that all residents on the voter's list for the 1980 elections, residents whose names do not figure in the 1980's lists but who have proof of residence like ration cards, child's birth certificates etc. and all residents till 1985 must be considered legible residents of Dharavi.

Residents. PMGP SOLUTION

1. Bureaucrats have come to accept that Dharavi is a composite of residential and commercial activity. As such of the 150 godowns excluding tanneries, about 100 come under "conforming activity which is non pollutant but still hazardous like manufacture of plastic granules, aluminium buffing and the like.

For these space can be provided in Dharavi itself but the godowns will have to be reconstructed.

Plans are afoot to set up a "service industrial centre" which will shelter all commercial activity of a similar nature in one huge building so that infrastructure like kilns, water, electricity etc can be provided at one spot itself.
Those involved in non conforming activity will have to be shifted out. Banwari compound residents have been accommodated in transit camps. The BMC was sent a notice restricting any reconstruction of burnt godowns. Three of the 30 godown owners have responded.

Tannery owners were prepared to shift near the Deonar Abattoir but PMGP allows FSI 1.33 while in Chembur FSI permissible is only .5 which means those who shift lose the advantage of more space.

2. Work on relocation of residents occupying tracts of land needed for major utility project has already started. In this 5000 families on the Belapur Mankhurd railway link project, 1700 families at Chikoowadi on the Andheri - Ghatkopar link road scheme and the 800 families on the Jogeshwari - Vikhroli link road scheme will be shifted to Mankhurd and Majaswadi respectively. Both areas are near the original location.

Efforts are on to construct new tenements in relocated areas with funds from PMGP, institutions and beneficiaries, contributions for the tenements which are expected to cost Rs.30-35000 each. While down payments will be Rs.500, monthly, installments work out to Rs.150/- For those unable to make the down payments some voluntary groups like Casp Plan and Tragler have come forward with sponsorship schemes.

3. Ground plus 3 structures are a must of the PMGP has to use the maximum permissible FSI of 1.66 in Dharavi. Not a single residential family will be forced to leave. If space has to be allocated for a school, either the non conforming industries or the 4500 families occupying reserved plots will have to move out.

The concept of multi storeyed buildings and self contained flats will lure the middle class to buy flats in the area as it was centrally located.

4. Making transfers of land illegal for a certain stipulated period of time will not work in such situations. Benami transfers will become the order of the day. PEOPLE'S SOLUTIONS

1. NSDF - DVS proposal on the other hand envisages ground plus one structure that will cost Rs.30,000 with construction costs being cut by using cement from the controlled market, dispensing with outside contractors and pile foundation and society members themselves buying raw materials. Space in each nagar will be used according to the needs and suggestions of its residents instead of imposing similar structures through out Dharavi.

2. NSDF/DVS alternate scheme has drawn up plans in which tanneries can be zoned off and their owners and families allowed to remain.

3.NSDF has built one 'model' house at the cost of Rs.13,500 to show the PMGP and the other residents that low cost housing is possible and nearer the needs of the slum dwellers.

4.DVS has worked out a development plan of their own, based on their own priorities, realities and needs. It is based on sound settlement planning principles including space allocations, roads, drainage, toilets, water points, creches, balwadis, schools, health centres, ration shops, playgrounds, community centres. They have designed two storey housing units which combines reduced density and increased space per unit at a lower cost than the units planned by PMGP.
5. The Dharavi Vyavasai Ekta Manch has launched a study of various trades within Dharavi collecting data on around 3000 commercial activities that would serve as a comprehensive database on the different occupation and employment patterns among the both men and women.

They stress that Dharavi's redevelopment program the focus is largely on the residential aspect of people's lives and not their occupations. In the lives of the poor, work and shelter are very closely associated. People live close to their place of work. this is especially true in Dharavi. Thus all policy decisions which dictate the future of business activity in Dharavi will directly affect its residents.

6. The daily turn over at Dharavi is over 7 lakhs. Markandya society has 84 families in the self-help housing scheme of PMGP. Each room measuring 10"x18"x13.9. The plan ran into trouble because as per 1983 building bye laws of the BMC a height of 13.9 ft. was permitted but the state government had not yet approved of it. As per the older bye laws each room could only have a permitted height of 10 ft. This meant the resident could not construct a loft which could accommodate more sleeping place.

7. Having a terrace as it would be unauthorisedly covered. The terrace which has finally been passed by the authorities was planned by the architects so as to give common playing ground for the children and other community activities.

8. The people of Markandeya society approached PMGP officials to secure a loan from HUDCO only to be told that no loan would be given. Later however they were told that HUDCO's rate of interest are far lower and more acceptable.

9. In an attempt to hammer out a via media between development and escalating property value DVS/SPARC have got together to hold a training program on housing the stress in the new training programme will be on non multi storeyed housing which is functional rather than cosmetic. What is important is that residents will develop and evolve at their own pace and will not be subject to the structured time targets of the PMGP or any administrative venture.

6000 bank account have been opened, attempts are being made to save money and women attending the workshops are voicing their needs.

11. The members find the present allocation 3 tier system of land 160, 180 and 220 unacceptable and impractical. Under the National Housing Policy 240 sq.ft. was the minimum required and PMGP argument that land was inadequate was wrong.

12. DVS's answer to this is a plan of action where in residents get together and evolve their own housing needs with a little bit of help from city architects.

Of the Rs.37 crore allotment for Dharavi, Rs.2 crores had been used to widen and deepen the Mithi river which cuts through Dharavi, by the BMRDA.

The BMC was given Rs.18 crore for developing infrastructural facilities like sewerage, water supply etc. of which it had spent Rs.4.5 crore on peripheral works and Rs.4 crore had been spent on 1,300 transit tenements.
Rs.37 crore was sanctioned for Dharavi redevelopment scheme Rs.13.57 crore was spent by the end of August last. BMC had spent only 4.34 crore of sanctioned 18 crore. BMC assured Rs.12.69 crore would be spent by March 1990.

Deshmukh said there were 38,000 hutments in Dharavi. 13,000 slum dwellers were covered by the cooperative societies though first phase envisages covering 29,000.

Provision was now made for schools, grounds, markets, internal roads and a college. Under redevelopment 23 leather tanneries and in all 300 families engaged in leather trade would be shifted to Mankhurd.

The MHADA (17 crore for housing) scheme consisted of a slum upgradation programme (SUP) and a reconstruction programme to be implemented through cooperative housing society. So far 118 cooperative societies with 25000 H.H.s has been formed. Of the 28000 HH's being taken up in the 1st phase 25,000 have opted for SUP and 3000 for total reconstruction.

The project departed from the Bombay Housing and Area Development Board in some crucial spheres. The PMGP sought to incorporate into urban renewal.

By this civic amenities and development plan work including construction of playgrounds, schools or dispensaries will be taken up along with reconstruction of buildings. There are 27 schemes under urban renewal involving over 100 buildings and 4000 tenements. About 2000 tenements have already been readied and about 600 families have occupied these at Umerkhadi and Barrister House.

December 20, 1987 - to date Rs.10 crore of the total Rs.37 crore from PMGP has been released for Dharavi. Of this 2.5 crore has been allotted to the BMC to improve civic amenities. Rs.2 crore to the BMRDA Bombay Metropolitan Regional Development Authority for channeling the Mithi river which flows through Dharavi into the sea. Rs.5.5 crore to the PMGP for slum upgradation and urban renewal. The actual expenditures incurred by all e authorities so far is Rs.133.03 lakh.

PMGP officials admit that both programmes, working concurrently, are bound to create a certain imbalance since some residents may be able to afford reconstruction and others may seek only the slum upgradation programmes.

The PMGP is keen to form cooperatives of at least 10,000 families by March 1989.

1989

The government maintains that after teething troubles the project is going smoothly and already names of 118 societies had been reserved with 13,000 families as members. Of these 26 societies have opted for total reconstruction and the rest for slum upgradation (SUP). At least 400 tenements would be constructed by March 1990 in 40-50 buildings. The buildings will have 4 floors and maximum FSI would be utilized for their construction.

Three societies were registered with 373 members and their cases had been sent to BMC for leasing them land. While people had come together to form societies their regularisation were being delayed by BMC.
Seven societies have already been formed and the PMGP team is unching a major drive towards formation of more societies.

Urban renewal is the largest component of the PMGP with 41 crore earmarked for repair and reconstruction of old and dilapidated buildings. Political parties have lately entered the picture and residents complain that there are constant tussles between Congress I and Shiv Sena over formation of societies. Both parties would like their candidates to be appointed Chief promoters of societies, so that the credit for the formation of the societies may be appropriated.

Again, outsiders managed to obtained a foot hold into the development area and stories abound of old residents being pressured to sell their allotments to outsiders.

Residential activity posed quite difficult problems as members of cooperative societies disgruntled with the space allotted to them, moved the court and secured stays on construction work.

The development plan does not have any specific allocation for sub tenants and boarders. In fact population surveys of Dharavi's barely took these residents into consideration and any census virtually rendered them invisible. Now plans are on the anvil to modify the "rahen basera" dharamshalas of Delhi but the PMGP needs voluntary organizations to run these.

1989 July - New BMC rules permit 14 ft. height. A large number of Dharavi's residents live in boarding houses or on lofts or attics of chawls. Residents of the boarding houses are mostly temporary and move out for better tenements. Residents who live on lofts are largely permanent and possess ration cards but have never figured on census lists since enumerators have not been taught to consider them as separate family units. They, therefore, form a large section of Dharavi's invisible population which needs civic amenities and is yet not provided for.

Dharavi does not possess any homogeneous groups, there is no choice of members for societies, grass root level leadership is open to political manipulations and residents come from different economic groups.